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WHY SO MANY  LAWYERS?  ARE  THEY GOOD
OR BAD?*
DEAN ROBERT C. CLARK"
In this essay, Dean Clark examines the popular  notion that the United States has
too many lawyers and that this abundance  burdens the nation.  While acknowl-
edging the great  growth of  law and lawyers in recent decades,  Dean Clark argues
that, before denouncing this trend, we should  first seek to develop a fuller expla-
nation of  its causes and consequences. After discussing  just what it is that lawyers
do, Dean Clark critiques three current "cancerous  growth" theories that attempt
to explain why there has been such a great  and unhealthy increase  in the number
of lawyers  Dean Clark then offers and analyzes  four "benign growth" theories-
theories based  on the assumption that the increasing  demand  for lawyers'services
is an understandable  consequence of  fundamental social,  political,  and economic
changes. Throughout  the essay, Dean Clark  indicates  areas  where additional  re-
search may yield a deeper understanding  of the forces that shape the roles that
lawyers assume in society and the demand for legal services.
INTRODUCTION:  THE PHENOMENON
IN  1960,  there  was  one  lawyer  for  every  627  people  in  the  United
tates.  In  1988,  there was one lawyer for every  339 people.'  During
the last half of this twenty-eight year period,  the number  of lawyers in
the United States increased at a rate that was more than five times faster
than the rate of growth for the general population.  We are now moving
toward the landmark figure of one million U.S.  lawyers.  And although
the recent recession was accompanied  by a drop in the demand for legal
services,  in  1991,  for  the fifth  consecutive  year, the total enrollment  at
*  This  essay  is  adapted  from  a  John  M.  Olin  Foundation  lecture  delivered  at
Fordbam  University Law School in  the spring of 1992.  It retains the informality of the
lecture.  Numerous  lawyers  and  colleagues  have  offered  useful  comments  on  earlier
versions of the essay; special thanks are due to Steve Shavell, Louis Kaplow, and Detlev
Vagts.
**  Dean  and Royall Professor of Law, Harvard  Law  School.
1. A fuller tabulation shows that the growth was not simply an artificial effect of the
booming  1980s:
U.S.Population  Lawyers  P/L Ratio
1960  179,323,000  285,933  627/1
1970  203,302,000  355,242  572/1
1980  226,546,000  542,205  418/1
1988  245,100,000  723,189  339/1
All  figures  except those for  1988  taken  from  Barbara  A.  Curran et  al.,  American  Bar
Foundation,  The  Lawyer  Statistical  Report  4 (1985).  U.S.  population  figure  for  1988
obtained from the United States Dep't of Commerce,  Bureau of the Census,  U.S.A.  Sta-
tistics in  Brief:  Statistical  Abstract  Supplement  (1992).  Lawyer  number  for  1988  ob-
tained from Barbara A. Curran,  American  Bar Foundation.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ABA-approved  law  schools  actually  increased.2  I  calculate  that  if we
keep going in this way, by the year 2023 there will be more lawyers than
people.
Is this trend bad  or good?  Do we really  understand  why it has  oc-
curred?  I intend to return to the latter question, but I first want to estab-
lish the magnitude of the phenomenon.
Not only has there been an extraordinary increase during the last three
decades  in the number  of lawyers,  both  absolutely  and relative  to  the
general population, but there has  also been great measurable  growth in
the amount of legal services  consumed  and in the  amount of law.  This
growth  is  evident  in  a  few  facts  marshalled  by  Marc  Galanter  and
Thomas Palay  in their important book,  The Tournament of Lawyers:
OIn the twenty-five year period after 1960, the population of the
United States  grew by 30%.  Keep this 30%  growth figure  in
mind as a benchmark for comparison.  In the same period, the
number of lawyers increased  by almost  130%.
'In  the same twenty-five  year period,  the percentage  of GNP
devoted to  outside legal services more than doubled.
eIn  the  same  period,  the  amount  of law  increased  exponen-
tially, as suggested  by these  tidbits:
epages  added  annually  to the Federal  Register  increased
by 270%;
*pages added annually to the West regional reporters grew
by  149%;
epages  added  annually  to  the federal  reporters  grew  by
336%  (about 93,588  pages of federal  cases added in 1985
alone, for example);
'the  full-time staff of the fifty-five major federal regulatory
agencies  grew  176%,  and  their  budgets  increased  by
237%. 3
The point to  note about  these figures  is that they  are all much greater
than the growth of the population and the economy, and that this differ-
ence has prevailed  for a  long time-since World  War  II, actually-not
just for the  last few years,  or during the booming  1980s.  Furthermore,
other evidence  suggests  that many  other countries  are  becoming  more,
not less,  like the United States in their reliance on law and lawyers.4  In
Europe, for example,  the continued  growth and complexification  of the
institutions  of the European  Community  have been accompanied  by an
upsurge in  legal  activity.  Brussels  has  become  like Washington,  D.C.,
2.  See  American  Bar  Association,  A  Review  of Legal  Education  in  the  United
States, Fall  1991,  at 67  (1992).
3.  See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Tournament of Lawyers:  The Transfor-
mation of the Big Law  Firm 37-48  (1992).
4.  See, eg.,  Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlan-
tic, 55 Mod. L. Rev.  1, 4 (1992)  (showing how statistics for Canada, England, and Wales
tell a similar story to those for the United States).
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where  everyone  is presumed to  be a lawyer  until proven  otherwise.  In
South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan the legal profession  acts like a monop-
oly to  hold down pass rates  on  the bar exam,  but inexorable  pressures
have built up to increase the yield of formally denominated  lawyers.  In
Eastern  Europe  and in the former Soviet  Union,  the  demand  for legal
experts to help devise an infrastructure for democratically  oriented mar-
ket economies is almost insatiable.  In sum, law and lawyers have become
more important  in  our  society  and,  in  fact,  throughout  much  of the
world.
In addition to changes in the number of lawyers, there were interesting
and profound changes in the organization of the profession.  On average,
law firms became bigger and were more likely to have branches in multi-
ple cities, both in the United States and abroad.  For example, from 1975
to  1989, the top fifty American  law firms  went from an average  of 133
attorneys  per firm  to an  average  of 476.1  Galanter  summarizes  these
trends as follows:
In the course of a generation, there has been a dramatic change in scale
of many  aspects  of the  legal  world:  the  amount  and  complexity  of
legal regulation;  the frequency  of litigation; the amount and  tenor of
authoritative legal material; the number, coordination  and productiv-
ity of lawyers; the number of legal actors and the resources they devote
to legal activity; the amount of information about law and the velocity
with which it circulates.
6
I.  INTERPRETATION  AND  EVALUATION
How should we regard these trends?  To many observers and commen-
tators, it has seemed clear that something rotten and unhealthy has been
going on.  Vice President Quayle caused a stir in the national media by
suggesting that there are too many lawyers and too much litigation, and
that something  should  be done about it.7  Commentator  Walter  Olson
published  a book  entitled  The Litigation Explosion,8  and  many  others
5. Computed  from survey information reported in National  Law Frn Survey, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 7,  1978, at  12-13,  and  The NLJ 250, Nat'l LJ., Sept.  18,  1989,  at $4-S7.
6.  Galanter, supra note 4, at 2.
7. See  e.g.,  Julie Johnson & Ratu Kamlini, Do We Have Too Mlany Lavyers?,  Time,
Aug. 26,  1991, at 54 (commenting on Vice President  Quayle's speech at the 1991  annual
meeting of the American  Bar Association).
8.  See Walter K. Olson, The Litigation  Explosion:  What Happened  When America
Unleashed the Lawsuit (1991);  see also Peter W. Huber, Liability:  The Legal Revolution
and Its Consequences  (1988)  (criticizing the explosive  growth  in personal  injury litiga-
tion); Warren E. Burger,  Too Many Lawyers, Too Many Suits, N.Y. Times  Book Rev.,
May  12,  1991,  at  12 (reviewing  Olson).
Claims of a litigation explosion have not gone without serious challenge based on close
examination of available evidence.  See  eg., I American Law Institute, Reporter's Study,
Enterprise  Responsibility  for  Personal  Injury:  The  Institutional  Framework  5  (1991)
("More systematic analysis of claims trends has demonstrated either that there never was
a true general explosion in tort litigation, or at least that any incipient trend has definitely
subsided.");  Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What  We Know and
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have used  the phrase, typically  with an indignant  tone.  Derek Bok, the
former  president of Harvard University,  has written  and spoken  of the
regrettable  situation  that has  resulted  from  the luring  of the  best  and
brightest  young  minds  away  from  science, engineering,  education,  and
public  service and into the legal profession and business.'
My  view,  however, is that it is premature to denounce the growth  of
law and lawyers.  We should first seek to understand  the causes and con-
sequences  of this growth far better than we currently  do.  Most of the
popular explanations of the trend are not carefully thought through, and
most are not tested against evidence or competing explanations.  It is my
intent  here,  not  to  offer a  definitive  theory  or set of explanations,  but
rather to  put forward  some explanatory  hypotheses  that may  stimulate
further inquiry along lines now being neglected.  I cannot give you a the-
ory that is fully specified and fully tested.  I only hope to offer hypotheses
that are somewhat definite, that are tied to some intuitively understanda-
ble causal mechanisms,  and that are linked to enough first-order factual
data to make them at least plausible, so that further argument and testing
seems  worthwhile, and rash theories are put into question.
A.  The Need for Interpretation  and Explanation
At this point, some may ask whether it is really important to look for
causes.  Why, after all, should we look hard for a truly sustainable expla-
nation of the growth of law and lawyers?  Regardless of why the growth
occurred, it may be argued,  we can still assess the trend critically.
In a narrow  sense, this response is correct.  In particular  areas of law,
we may  indeed be able to analyze legal rules and processes and  imagine
better  ways  of handling the  underlying  problems without  really  under-
standing how we got to where  we are.  For example,  consider the argu-
ments for reform of medical malpractice law explored by Professor Paul
Weiler in light of a Harvard group's massive empirical study of malprac-
tice.'0  Those who  accept the study's findings  of fact and description  of
the problems in the system might well be led to conclude that, regardless
of how the current situation came about, we should shift from tort litiga-
tion to a no-fault system of responding to medical injuries,  since  such a
shift  would  lower the  costs  of processing  claims,  increase  the  ratio  of
medically  injured  people  who  receive  compensation,  and  increase  the
chance that net compensation is adequate, while not really creating a risk
of more malpractice.
I do not mean to deny that there may be much room for improvements
Don't Know (and Think  We Know) About Our  Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Soci-
ety,  31  UCLA L. Rev. 4, 37  (1983)  (empirical evidence suggesting that number of law-
suits brought in federal courts had not increased  appreciably in recent years compared  to
population  growth).
9.  See,  e.g.,  Derek  C. Bok,  A  Flawed System  of Law Practice and Training, 33  J.
Legal Educ.  570 (1983).
10.  See Paul  C. Weiler,  Medical Malpractice  on Trial  114-58  (1991).
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of this sort in our legal system.  However, critical analyses of this type do
not justify a sweepingly negative  view of the growth of law and lawyers,
and  they  do  not justify  calls for  "de-legalizing"  society  or for steering
bright students away from law schools.  Basically, this is the case because
such reform  analyses  do  not explain  how our  society  came  to  have so
much law, or whether the growth was bad compared  to what had been
happening.
B.  Armchair Comparativism
Nevertheless, there are many spirited attempts to criticize the growth
of law  in general,  without  explaining  how  the  growth  happened.  The
most  familiar  attack  is  that  of the  armchair  comparativist.  Probably
every reader has heard this argument:  The Japanese do not have nearly
as many lawyers in relation to the size of their population, yet they have
(or,  at  least  until  recently,  did have)  a  thriving  economy  and  polity.
Ergo,  there  must  be something  wrong with  our  society,  and our  high
spending  on legal services is inherently  wasteful.
Since this intended grenade of an argument-why do we need so many
lawyers if the Japanese do not?-has been lobbed into debates countless
times, there  are by now some  standard responses  to it.  One is that we
face  different conditions.  The  Japanese  are  a  relatively  homogeneous
people.  In contrast, the United States contains a heterogeneity of diverse
and conflicting subgroups, the interrelationships of which need to be reg-
ulated  by  the  rule  of law  rather  than  by  universally  accepted  social
custom.
Another response to  the denunciatory  armchair comparativist  has  to
do with comparative  advantage.  The United  States  (and  perhaps some
other  countries  inheriting  the  common  law  tradition,  or  some  other
Western  democracies)  is particularly  good at using  law  and  lawyers  to
help organize its economy and social relations; Japan is particularly good
at other methods  of management  and organization,  such  as  instilling a
cooperative  attitude in its citizens.  There  is no  assurance  that trying to
imitate the Japanese in this respect would be a good move for us.
In  addition  to  these  points  about  different  conditions  and  different
comparative  advantages,  there  is  a less  frequently  raised  point that  is
much more important for my  present  analysis.  This point  is that com-
paring  "lawyers"  in the United  States and in  Japan  is  like  comparing
apples and oranges."  When counting lawyers in the United States,  one
typically considers  persons who have completed law school and been ad-
mitted  to the  bar in one  or more  states.  But only  a minority  of these
individuals actually  appear in court on a regular basis.  Most of the rest
11.  This point is developed  with some wit in Ray August, Mythical Kingdom  of  Law-
yers:  America Doesn't Have 70 Percent of the Earth's  Lawyers, A.B.A.  J.,  Sept.  1992,  at
72-74  (disputing Vice President Quayle's made-up statistic and ranking countries by ef-
fective "law  providers" per  10,000  population in  1987).
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perform  a wide range of law-related  tasks such as counseling,  planning,
and deal-making.  In addition,  some  of those admitted  to  the bar have
gravitated  into  rather  distantly  related roles,  such  as  that  of corporate
officer,  real estate  developer,  or executive  in a  government  agency.  In
Japan, by contrast, the number of "lawyers"  is usually taken to be indi-
cated by the number of bengoshi, that is, those law-trained persons who
have actually been admitted to practice in court.
Most bengoshi  actually do have a  court-centered  legal  practice.  But
they are not the whole story.  In Japan, legal study is primarily a matter
of undergraduate  education,  and,  as it turns out, law is one of the most
popular majors.  Indeed, evidence  for recent years indicates that the ab-
solute  number  of law  students  is  greater in  Japan than  in  the  United
States, despite the fact that Japan's population  is roughly half that of the
United States. 12  Of the vast number of Japanese  college graduates  who
major in law, only a small percentage go on to become bengoshi.13  Many
of the others go on to work in large, formal organizations.  They become
bureaucrats  or staff the law  departments  in corporations  or in  govern-
ment agencies.  It is quite plausible  to suppose that their legal training
helps  all  such bureaucrats  to function  in these  worlds,  where  they  are
often  called  upon  to  devise and  administer  standard  operating  proce-
dures, to work out the structure of rights and duties between their organ-
ization and others, and so forth.  These "non-bengoshi"  are not certified
as professionals, and they are probably  not as specialized  in law-related
tasks as are most American "lawyers,"  but they  do many  things that in
the United States might be done by members of the bar, and they  have
received  legal training. 14
What this brief glimpse at Japan suggests is that it is quite important,
before proceeding further in our theorizing, to have a better idea of what
we  are  talking  about.  What  is a  lawyer?  If we  want  to  look  beyond
formal  credentials  and certifications,  as it seems  we should,  how might
we define the beast?  Or to pose the inquiry in a more useful and manage-
able way, what is it that formally certified lawyers characteristically  do in
our society?  Once we have a more comprehensive and accurate notion of
12.  See  Masanobu  Kato,  The  Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the  United
States, 1987 B.Y.U.  L. Rev.  627, 661  (1987)  (presenting data  that, for example, in  1984
there  were  159,000  law  students  in  Japan  versus  120,000  law  students  in  the  United
States).
13.  See John 0.  Haley,  The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. Japanese Stud. 359,
385  (1978)  (number  of bengoshi  deliberately  limited  by  strictly  enforced  examination
policy).
14.  See Richard  S. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in Japan  and
the United States, 39  J. Legal Educ.  27, 29-31  (1989)  (describing work done in Japan  by
unlicensed legal experts  that would be done in the United States by lawyers); Richard B.
Parker, Law, Language, and the Individual in Japan and the United States, 7 Wis.  Int'l
L.J.  179,  179 n. 1 (1988)  (discussing how, in Japan, individuals with  only undergraduate
law degrees  staff the law  departments of large corporations  and government  ministries,
and do much of the work done by lawyers  in the United States).
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what most lawyers do, we may be able to think more precisely about why
the demand for such work may  have increased.
II.  WHAT LAWYERS  Do
What is the essence of being a lawyer?  What is it that lawyers do?  My
answer is that they create, find, interpret, adapt, apply, and enforce rules
and  principles  that  structure  human  relationships  and  interactions.
More  briefly,  lawyers  "handle"  the  rules and  norms  that  define rights
and duties among people and organizations.  That is, they are specialists
in normative ordering.
At the outset, it is important not to equate lawyers with litigators, or
with professionals who practice law in courts.  Most lawyers are not liti-
gators, 5 and yet the tasks that these out-of-court  practitioners specialize
in are connected  to a comprehensive  and reasonably coherent notion of
what constitutes "lawyers'  work."  It is also important not to equate law-
yers' work with work that concerns law in the special sense of commands
laid  down by or  traceable  to  a  sovereign,  or  to  a  formal  government.
This public side of law accounts for only part of what lawyers do.  There
is no good reason  to make  it an exclusive  touchstone of what counts as
legal work, and to ignore the fact that many lawyers engage principally
in private ordering, or in tasks that intertwine public and private sources
of normative ordering in complex ways.  The private-ordering  aspect of
the legal profession's work is sometimes assumed to be collateral or acci-
dental  to work  centered  on "real"  (that  is,  public)  law,  but  this  is  an
arbitrary  and short-sighted  view.  The knot  that properly  ties together
the myriad activities of so many practicing lawyers is that they are often
engaged  in handling rules, norms,  and principles  that define the rights
and  duties that  people  and organizations  have  with  and  toward  each
other.
A.  Arenas of Normative Ordering
It is helpful to define the concept of normative ordering extensionally
as well  as intensionally.  There are at least six distinct  arenas of norma-
tive ordering.  One is legislation.  In our society, lawyers are dispropor-
tionately involved in legislation, both as legislators and  as lobbyists and
advocates of new statutes.  A second  and related  arena is administrative
rule-making.  Again, lawyers tend to participate here as both as the rule-
makers and as the advocates.  A third area is private deal-making, which
15.  See, e.g.,  Leonard L. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law
School Graduates,  29 J. Legal  Educ.  264, 278  (1978)  (only  11.8%  of 969  practitioners
surveyed reported  that their primary practice area was "trial and litigation").  Good sys-
tem-wide data about the allocation of lawyers'  efforts among their different  roles do not
seem to be available,  and the subject has  received surprisingly  little scholarly  attention.
Nevertheless,  I doubt that many lawyers who are acquainted  with  a range  of large and
mid-sized law firms and who regularly read the national  legal newspapers  would dispute
the judgment that most lawyers are not litigators.
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comprises  the  many  phases  of  negotiating  and  drafting  agreements.
Structurally, this vast private arena of day-to-day lawyers'  work is quite
analogous  to  legislation  and  administrative  rule-making.  For to make
deals  is  to  find,  create,  adapt,  and  apply  rules  defining  the  rights  and
duties among people and organizations.  That the process  involves  gov-
ernment actors and formal "law"  only remotely (or as a background real-
ity  casting  a  shadow  over the  bargaining)  does  not  make  it  any  less
lawyers'  work.  A fourth arena is counseling and planning.  Lawyers in-
terpret rules and norms (both publicly and privately created) for a partic-
ular client, and advise the client about action to be taken in light of the
rules.  Obviously,  this  category  covers  a  vast  portion  of  what  many
American  lawyers  actually  do.  A  fifth  category  is  dispute  resolution
through non-judicial means such as arbitration and mediation.  These ac-
tivities also involve the enforcement and adaptation of norms.  And, last,
though not least, there is litigation, or the enforcement of rules by courts.
B.  Lawyers as Specialists in Normative Ordering
Legislation,  administrative rule-making, private contracting  and deal-
making,  counseling and planning, mediation,  arbitration,  and litigation
all involve the processing of rules and norms that structure and stabilize
human relationships.  In other words,  these  activities are  all aspects  of
normative ordering.  But lawyers are not the only people who participate
in normative ordering.  In many societies,  including our own,  there is a
vast amount of activity that could be classified as normative ordering as I
use the term, yet the activity is not performed by lawyers.  Mothers and
fathers do a great deal of normative ordering, for example.  They inherit
or create, and attempt to assert and enforce, rules applicable to their chil-
dren;  they bargain  and negotiate  with each  other  and their children to
establish relative rights and duties; and they attempt dispute resolution in
part by reliance on alleged norms.  Yet they are not lawyers, and norma-
tive ordering is only one aspect of their  parental roles.  In contrast, law-
yers  are specialists in  normative  ordering,  and  they  are members  of a
recognizable profession that has all the attributes classically attributed to
a profession by the sociologists:  a long and cumulative tradition of spe-
cialized learning, a requirement of special training, strict and clear entry
points,  mechanisms  to assure independence  and self-regulation,  and  so
forth.  Consequently, any  theory that attempts to  explain the growth  of
law and lawyers in the United States should pay some attention not only
to factors that might increase the volume of normative ordering, but also
to those factors that might result in this work being left to professional-
ized specialists  such as lawyers.
III.  SOME  CANCEROUS  GROWTH  THEORIES
Various lines of thought suggest that the growth in the legal profession
is something  to wring  our hands about,  and that if we  only had a little
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backbone we would take steps to reverse the trend.  There are as many
variations on this theme as there are cocktail parties and barrooms, but I
will limit myself to discussing  three of the more serious theories.  These
theories  allege and stress, respectively:  widespread decline in the moral
fabric of society; the capacity of lawyers to induce demand for their own
services; and imperfections  in the market for legal services.
A.  Individual and Social Decline
It  can  be  argued  that  there  has  been  a  breakdown,  at  least  in  the
United States, in the efficacy of non-legal forms of social control such as
the family, the neighborhood,  the school, and the major religions, with a
resulting increase  in reliance on  law.  Under this theory,  the growth of
law can be seen as a compensatory substitute for forms of social control
that have  been  greatly  weakened  by  various  forces  and  trends  in our
modem  society.  In  other words,  since  the  family  and the  schools  are
unable to make people behave, the criminal justice system must give it a
try.
Even  assuming  such  a  breakdown,  two  cautions  must  be  sounded.
First, this theory  does not, without more, imply that the growth of law
has  been bad.  Indeed,  precisely  to  the  extent  that  the  theory  is  true,
reducing  reliance on  law and  lawyers would  make  things  worse rather
than better, unless other forms of social control were instituted or rebuilt.
Yet restoring  these other forms  of control  may not be  feasible or cost-
effective.  The forces  that have weakened the  efficacy of religions as  in-
struments of social  control, altered the composition  of household  units,
and sterilized the schools as purveyors of moral education may simply be
too great to turn back at any acceptable  cost.  The horses may be out of
the barn.  At the very least, there is great room for debate on this point.
Put another  way,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  the  moral-decline  theory
should lead us to view the growth of law as cancerous, so my initial clas-
sification of this theory may be  inaccurate.
Second,  and more  important  for  my purpose,  even  if this  theory  is
valid,  it seems  to explain  only  a modest part of the  growth  of law.  It
takes note of forces  connected with an increase in criminal activity  and
family strife, and may help to explain the growth of legal activity in these
areas.  Yet this is only a modest subset of law practice.  The theory does
not seem so useful in explaining the vast growth in so many other areas
of law-in particular, growth in the major regulatory areas such as envi-
ronmental law, health law, and the like, or in the many areas of business
law practice that occupy most sizable law firms.
True, one could speculate about how to extend  moral-decline theories
to  reach these  other areas  of law.  Perhaps children  who  are  raised  in
broken  or morally  weak  families  grow  up  to  be  especially  greedy  and
litigious, with  the result that they  figure  quite disproportionately  in the
creation  of regulatory  schemes and in the generation of lawsuits among
businesses.  Maybe  so;  anything is  possible.  It seems  to  me,  however,
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that we  should  demand  much  more particularized  evidence  before  ac-
cepting such a speculative  view.
B.  Lawyer-Created Demand
There is a familiar sense in which one lawyer  can breed work for an-
other.  If shopkeeper Victor  goes to the only  lawyer in town to  sue his
landlord, Steven, then Steven is likely to feel at a great disadvantage until
he can bring in a lawyer to help his side.  More generally,  not just law-
suits but many transactions are two-sided, and a lawyer on one side cre-
ates  demand for a lawyer  on the other.
Notice a key aspect of this story.  It is assumed that a lawyer provides
something of real  value to a client (why else would the client be willing
to pay?),  and that the full value can only be provided by a professional,
or specialist.  But it is not apparent, without more, why this sort of multi-
plication of lawyers is bad.  Indeed, what would need to be explained is a
judgment that lawyers make things worse on balance, even though clients
are eager and willing to buy their services.  To turn the fact of competi-
tion for legal talent into a cancerous growth theory, one has to focus on
the  services  provided  by  lawyers  and  argue  that  they  are  wealth-
destroying.
A more macroscopic theory of lawyer-created demand is that we need
more lawyers because there is now more regulation,  yet it was the law-
yers who created the extra regulation, even though it was not useful.  The
trick to making this "rap" stick is to show, rather than assume, that the
added  regulation  is  bad  rather  than  good-or,  more  precisely,  that
lawmakers  create  regulations  out of desire  for legal  work per se rather
than to meet some other, deeper, independently  valid purposes.  It is not
enough  simply  to  note  that  many  legislators,  agency  personnel,  and
judges  are lawyers.
Actually demonstrating such a flaw in our legislative system would be
very difficult.  In fact, after reading about the origin of some major regu-
latory schemes, I am tempted to propose that it is quite implausible.  In
general, one seems always to find some interest group that had a particu-
larly passionate interest in insisting on new legislation-for example, the
Medicare  and Medicaid statutes, the major environmental laws,  and the
pension laws.  Either that, or another interest group wanted  to limit reg-
ulation by qualifying and thus complicating the statutes, and thereby ad-
ding further  (at least temporarily)  to the demand  for lawyers'  services.
In either case, it seems far-fetched  to claim that lawyers themselves  "cre-
ated" or even induced the demand for regulation, or for deregulation and
complexifying  compromise, or for their own services.  If there has been a
shift over  time in the demand for regulation,  one ought  to look for  its
source in more fundamental  factors, such as those that I discuss later.
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C.  Market Imperfections
This theory posits that there are imperfections  in the market for legal
services, and that these imperfections  operate to increase rather than de-
crease  the  amount of such  services that are consumed.  The main cul-
prits, in my view,  are asymmetrical information and moral hazard (two
terms taken from the economic analysis of law).  Interestingly, these cul-
prits are also key factors at work in the market  for medical services,  a
market that has seen far greater growth in the last 30 years than the legal
sector.
In the medical world, patients normally do not have as much informa-
tion  as  their  physicians  do  about the  optimal  amount of consultation,
testing, and other medical procedures (e.g., whether to undergo  an angi-
oplasty  or not).  As  a  result,  patients  cannot easily judge  which  set  of
actions has the best ratio of benefit to cost.  This is so almost by hypothe-
sis.  The whole point of a rational doctor-patient relationship depends on
informational  asymmetry:  one  goes  to  a  professional  in  large  part be-
cause the professional has intensive specialized  training and knows more
about what should be done.  If the professional has an incentive to err on
the side of more rather than fewer services-as physicians  do when they
operate on a fee-for-service basis-the patient is not in a good position to
second-guess the recommendations.  Greatly compounding this tendency
is health insurance.  To the extent it is available, then neither the patient
nor the physician has a financial incentive, at the point in time when they
decide whether the patient should consume an only possibly helpful test
or procedure that they know will be  covered by the patient's insurance,
to exercise any restraint.  They face what economists call a moral hazard:
they may choose  to consume more medical services than are needed  or
reasonable.  In the aggregate,  this blunted incentive or moral-hazard  ef-
fect may  mean that society will over-consume  medical  services.
Similarly,  many clients of lawyers have both poor ability and poor in-
centives  to monitor professional  services.  So when lawyers charge on  a
fee-for-service  basis,  too much  legal work may be produced.
Consider, for example, Juliet, the CEO of a corporation that is about
to buy, and to operate  as a wholly-owned  subsidiary, another company
that engages in risky activities that may at some point generate class ac-
tion lawsuits seeking enormous  damages.  Juliet turns to an outside  law
firm seeking advice on the extent  to which  such possible  lawsuits might
have  to be  satisfied  out  of the  parent  company's  assets.  The law  firm
assigns  an associate to research  the relevant case  law on corporate veil-
piercing  in  all  states  in  which  the  would-be  subsidiary  does  business.
There are in fact hundreds  of relevant cases.  The associate  may do re-
search for 20 hours; or for 40 hours, in which some deeper understanding
may in fact be achieved; or for 80 hours.  How could Juliet even begin to
second-guess the number of billable hours consumed, or to judge that the
law  firm  charged  for  excessive  research  (i.e.,  research  with  a  benefit
smaller  than  its cost).  Furthermore,  although  Juliet  is  not covered  by
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"legal  insurance,"  there is still a moral hazard problem  because her cor-
poration will pay the legal bill.  The cost is diffused among many share-
holders  and other  potential  claimants;  Juliet  herself does  not  bear the
cost of any excessive legal work, except perhaps in the most extreme situ-
ations.  Yet should Juliet choose, instead, to request no or minimum legal
service,  she may be personally  tainted by a bad legal outcome  that hap-
pens to follow.  So Juliet chooses to err on the side of excess by spending
more on legal services than may  really be optimal for the corporation.
My assessment is that there is undoubtedly some validity to this model
of imperfections  in the market for legal services.  Many  corporate coun-
sel and corporate consumers of legal services would agree that there is a
problem,  and  would classify  some  of the  more important  lawyer-client
developments of the last fifteen or twenty years as attempts to mitigate it.
So I  am told, over and over, that many corporate  clients now  insist on
itemized bills; that they insist on fixed rates, in advance, for certain types
of service;  that they shop  around  among  law firms;  and that they  now
bring more legal work in house, where it can be more closely monitored
by corporate officers  who are also lawyers.  Even with all these cost-con-
trol efforts,  however, no one seems  to believe that the basic problem .of
potential over-consumption  of legal services has been solved, as opposed
to mitigated.
Even granting that the market imperfections theory has validity, how-
ever, the real  question  is  how much  of the overall  growth  in  the legal
profession does this theory explain.  My guess is "not much."  After all,
clients faced comparable problems in monitoring legal services  a century
ago, yet the rapid growth of law is much more recent.  This suggests that
other factors must also be heavily involved.  Similarly,  the growth in law
has not been characterized  by a mere proportionate increase in the types
of legal service provided to organizations.  Instead, there have also arisen
whole new areas of legal regulation and law practice.  In addition, some
areas  of law  have grown  quite rapidly, while others have not.  It is  not
apparent  how this pattern  could be derived  from the  theory  of market
imperfections just explained.
To be sure, there are competing considerations suggesting that the role
of market  imperfections  in  explaining change in  the size  and  shape  of
legal  services-as opposed  to explaining  a more or less constantly  pro-
portionate amount of "fat"  in the legal system-is far from trivial.  It is
likely, for example, that there have been significant changes over time in
the relative severity of the knowledge and incentive problems in monitor-
ing legal services.
Consider  asymmetry  first.  True,  even  a  century  ago,  lawyers  knew
much about law that their clients did not, so there was serious asymme-
try of information.  But surely  the asymmetry is greater,  and  the moni-
toring and agency problems  associated with it have grown, now that the
legal system is so much more developed and complicated.  New areas  of
regulation  have  been  created,  and  their  existence  creates  information
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problems for lay persons,  who are driven  to seek  the advice  of lawyers
and to endure the agency problems  of the lawyer-client  relationship.
While the observation that the growth of regulation has increased  in-
formational asymmetry seems valid, note several points about it.  First, it
posits rather than explains the growth in regulation.  The assertion is not
that informational  asymmetry  between  lawyers  and  clients  has  caused
the proliferation  of new  types of regulation,  but that regulatory  growth
brings along with it a certain additional amount of information asymme-
try (and, therefore, more room for agency problems and  more potential
for overconsumption of legal services).  But it is the growth in regulation
that we  are most interested in explaining.  What caused  that?  Second,
the additional  asymmetry attendant upon new regulation  hardly implies
that the potential for excessive service outweighs the benefits of legal ad-
vice.  Quite the opposite seems true:  given the existence of new regula-
tions confronting clients,  clients  will go to lawyers for advice about the
regulations  only to  the extent  that the  expected  benefits  of the advice
outweigh  its  costs,  including  the  risk  of  receiving  more-than-optimal
service.
Consider next how incentive problems have changed.  It is clear that, a
century ago, a lesser percentage of total economic and other activity was
carried  out in large organizations  than  is the  case today.  Accordingly,
less activity took place in entities that could diffuse the cost of legal serv-
ices, so the blunted incentive  or moral hazard problem  was  less severe.
The individual farmer or sole proprietor cared very much about the size
of legal bills; the  corporate officer was less concerned.  In other words,
the subsequent  relative  growth  of corporations  and other  large  formal
organizations may have enabled an increased amount of "fat"  or inflation
in legal bills by expanding  the arenas in which moral  hazard  is present.
This observation also has some merit.  Note, however, that the growth
of corporations and similar formal organizations (e.g.,  government agen-
cies and  nonprofit  institutions)  has  also  expanded  the  arena  in  which
seeking legal advice from professionals  is rational and cost-effective.  (As
discussed below, this relationship follows from economies of scale in the
acquisition  and  application  of  legal  knowledge.)  Thus,  the  relative
growth of organizations  may have led to growth in the legal  profession
for two  distinct  reasons:  Organizational  growth  expands  the  realm  in
which professional advice is cost-effective  (a good effect);  and it expands
the realm in which incentives  to monitor lawyers are blunted (a bad  ef-
fect).  Given the reality and zeal of current corporate strategies to control
legal costs, it is quite plausible to suppose that the former kind of effect
outweighs the latter.
IV.  SOME  BENIGN  GROWTH THEORIES
A  widely  neglected  alternative  to the theories  so far considered  is to
posit that there are more lawyers  because there is a greater demand  for
the work  that  lawyers  do,  and  the greater  demand  is the  natural  out-
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growth  of fundamental  changes in  our society.  I  will propose  and ex-
plain four  such alternative  theories.  Each  of them is  an illustration  of
this more general proposition:  There are important long term social and
economic  trends that have greatly  increased  the demand  for normative
ordering  and, therefore,  the demand  for law and lawyers.
Recall my earlier proposal:  Lawyers  are specialists  in normative or-
dering; they make, adapt, apply, and enforce rules and norms that define
rights  and duties  among people  and organizations.  Given this  concep-
tion of lawyers'  work, why  might it be that the demand  for such work
would increase  so much  in our society in this century?
A full answer is difficult to offer, especially if one also wants to explain
cultural  differences  in reliance on law.  But several fundamental  factors
seem  to me to be important to any theory.  They  all involve important
economic or social trends that increase the demand for normative order-
ing.  At  the same  time, other  sources  of normative  ordering-such  as
religion  or  social custom-have  seemed  less  suited  than law to  handle
these new demands.
A.  Greater  Interaction, Including Greater  Internationalization
The increasing rate of interaction across national borders is one trend
that is clearly correlated with certain aspects of the growth in law.  Marc
Galanter and Joel Rogers have documented  several such relationships.16
For  example,  exports  and  imports  as  a  percentage  of gross  domestic
product increased from  10.5%  in 1960 to 23.3%  in 1985.'1  The demand
for normative ordering of these new international  relationships grew  ac-
cordingly.  Not surprisingly, the work of lawyers concerned with interna-
tional trade and finance has increased enormously;  it is one of the fastest
areas of growth in the market for legal services.  Similarly, movements of
people  across  borders  have  made  immigration  law  one  of the  fastest
growing areas of law practice.
It is  worth dwelling  for a moment on  why there  is  a connection  be-
tween international trade and finance and the work of lawyers.  Suppose
Steven  is the  chief executive of Thel Enterprises,  a large  chain  of retail
stores, and has just decided  to deal with a Korean manufacturer of elec-
tronic toys.  Even more than when dealing with a remote business entity
in his own culture, Steven is likely to feel the need for an expert,  special-
ized ordering of relative rights and duties between his firm and this  for-
eign  supplier.  He  wants  expectations  to  be  specified,  reliable,  and
mutually understood;  he wants the relationship to be squared away.  Yet
the "common  core of background  understandings"  that sometimes does
the trick in establishing smooth and stable business relationships may not
16.  See Marc Galanter & Joel Rogers, A Transformation of American  Business  Dis-
puting?  Some  Preliminary Observations,  at tbl.  2 (Institute  for Legal Studies,  Disputes
Processing Research Program Working  Paper DPRP  10-3,  1990).
17.  See Council  of Econ. Advisors,  1989 Annual Report tbls. B-I,  B-8 (in Economic
Report of the President  1989).
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be available cross culturally.  In particular, the "noncontractual  relations
in business"  made famous  by  Stuart Macaulay  in his classic  1963  arti-
cle" 8  are hard to establish and rely on in the international  context.
As a matter of fact, reliance on informal, nonlegal relationships and on
nonlegal sanctions for commercial misbehavior-such  as taking business
elsewhere or expressing social disapproval within an established group of
business persons-are now  less available  even  in the domestic  context.
Internationalization  is a reality that is relatively easy to spot and to think
about (and it is easy to see why it leads to more legal work), but it is just
a major component of a larger relevant change:  there are greater rates of
interaction  among business  entities in general,  and  this greater interac-
tion increases the demand for normative ordering.
Why might there be this greater interaction generally among business
entities?  One key factor is lowered relative costs of communication and
transportation,  which  themselves  are  due  to  technological  advances.
With better computers, photoreproduction,  overnight mail, and fax ma-
chines, businesses are able to process and communicate  a higher volume
of information  in a given period of time, and to deal more readily with
persons and entities in distant locations.  Business persons today are also
more  likely  to  travel  frequently  over a  given  span of years.  They  are
more likely to do business with a greater number and dispersion of indi-
viduals  and organizations.
Any increase  in the  volume  and rate of interactions  among business
transactors  leads  to  greater demand  to  structure  relationships-to  im-
pose rules and guidelines  on them so that they work  without too much
uncertainty  and friction.  And to the extent that the additional  interac-
tions are qualitatively  new, or involve remote parties that are not easily
subject to the discipline of nonlegal controls such as reputational  stand-
ing in the local community, then the demand for normative ordering by
lawyers  is not just greater,  but disproportionately greater.
Suppose, for example, the cattle ranchers  in Shasta County, California
that Yale Professor  Robert Ellickson describes in his book, Order With-
out Law,19  were  suddenly to start dealing  heavily  with buyers  on a na-
tionwide level.  (Perhaps they already do; Ellickson focused  on rancher-
farmer  relationships,  in  which  both sides  were  local.)  When  disputes
arise in these relationships, where would the cattle ranchers turn?  I sus-
pect that the norm of being a good neighbor would avail them little, and
they would quickly call their lawyers.  The cozy island of informal social
controls  is hard to sustain in a world  of rapidly expanding  and quickly
shifting relationships.
So far I have concentrated  on conveying the intuitive logic behind sup-
posing there is a connection between greater interaction  and greater de-
18.  See Stewart  Macaulay,  Non-Contractual  Relations in  Business.  A  Preliminary
Study, 28 Am.  Soc. Rev.  59  (1963).
19.  See Robert  C. Ellickson,  Order  Without  Law:  How Neighbors  Settle Disputes
15-120 (1991).
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mand for lawyers.  To make the hypothesis more specific and to test how
significant it is, one would have to focus more carefully on the timing of
particular  developments  in  business  and  law.  For  example,  the  great
growth in import and export activity that  I mentioned  earlier occurred
most dramatically  in the  1970s;  there was  a decline in the growth  rate
during the 1980s.  How does this square with the fact that so much of the
growth in international trade and finance law appears to have occurred in
the  1980s?  I  would  hypothesize that  legal  developments  often  lag the
economic and social  ferment that give rise to them, precisely  because  it
takes time to discover, formulate, and refine legal solutions and for them
to become widely and stably accepted.  My own study of legal doctrines
in the fields  in which  I work supports this view.  For example,  in the
1980s  it was  some  years  after a  distinct upsurge  in corporate  takeover
activity was visible to everyone before the Delaware Supreme Court be-
gan to issue rich and truly interesting opinions about the principles that
should  govern  responses to takeovers.  Similarly,  I suspect that current
developments in bankruptcy and reorganization  law will flourish and of-
fer  a bouquet  of doctrine to  delight  the most fastidious  law  professor
seeking to put together a definitive set of course materials only when the
current  wave of restructurings is  coming to a close!  (Alas, the law does
not exist for the classroom.)
B.  Greater  Diversity
In the last several decades, there have been great demographic changes
in our population.  The birth rates and immigration rates of many minor-
ity groups in the U.S. have outstripped the rates of increase of the white
majority population.  Between  1980  and  1990,  for example,  the general
population  increased by 9.8%,  while the population of Asian-American
and Pacific Islanders increased by 107.8%; people of Hispanic origin, by
53%;  African Americans, by 13.2%;  and whites, by only 6%.  By  1990,
about 20%  of the population was non-white.  About 25%  of the last dec-
ade's population  growth  occurred through immigration.20
Also  in the last  several  decades,  the  status and  role of women  have
changed.  For example, the participation of women  in the workplace has
increased  greatly.  There have also been changes  in families and house-
holds.  People marry later and divorce more often.2  A smaller percent-
age of households  are headed by married couples.22  The median age of
the population  is higher,2"  and older workers are a relatively more pow-
20.  See United States Dep't of Commerce,  Bureau of the Census, in The World  Al-
manac  and Book of Facts  1992,  at 77  (1991).
21.  From  1960 to  1990,  the median  age at  first marriage went  from 22.8  to 26.1  for
men and from 20.3  to 23.9 for women.  See id. at 943.  From  1960 to  1990,  the divorce
rate per  1,000  population went  from 2.2  to 4.7.  See Nat'l Ctr.  for Health  Statistics, in
The World Almanac and Book of Facts  1992, at  942 (1991).
22.  See The World Almanac and Book of Facts  1992, at  944-46 (1991).
23.  The median age went from 29.5  in  1960 to 32.9  in  1990.  United States Dep't of
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erful force in the economy.
Those of us who study, teach, or act as deans in law schools realize full
well that increasing  diversity,  while it has brought a more  exciting and
wonderful world, has also brought friction and tumult.  The conflict on
campuses  between  free  speech  and  offensive  speech,  the  debates  over
political correctness,  and the calls for greater diversity  in faculty hiring
are all manifestations of real demographic change.  More generally, dem-
ographic  changes  and changes  in the status  and role of subgroups lead
inevitably  to  some  conflict  among  groups  and  uncertainty  about  the
proper parameters of relationships, and this in turn raises the demand for
normative  ordering.  The  more  rapid  and significant  the  changes,  the
more likely they are to generate  situations of conflict or uncertainty that
need to be resolved or mediated.  In our society, this need has often been
responded to by resort to law and lawyers.  It is not really surprising, in
such an era of real demographic  change, to see a flourishing of law and
legal work relating to civil rights,  especially rules relating to discrimina-
tion  (on  the basis  of minority  status,  gender,  or age)  in  employment,
housing, and other contexts.  It is also not surprising to see more law and
legal  work  connected  to  family  relations,  abortion  rights,  and  related
matters.
C.  Changes in  Wealth Levels
One other likely source of growth in law is simply the gradual increase
in wealth. '  As more people satisfy  their basic needs for food,  shelter,
and the like,  they  move on to  previously  neglected  desires.  Suddenly,
they want more and better health care; they want a cleaner environment.
Inevitably, the systems we devise to respond to these new goals are com-
plicated.  They involve elaborate relationships among people and organi-
zations.  The  relationships  have  to  be  structured  by  rules-rules  that
cannot be fully derived  from social  custom,  religious  traditions,  or the
forces  of the marketplace. 2 5  Enter then  the lawyers.  For they  are the
Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, in The World Almanac and Book of Facts  1992, at  128
(1991).
24.  A leading  study found  that the most important  determinant  of the demand  for
lawyers is a country's gross national product, and attributed this relationship to the sup-
position that more transactions require more lawyers.  See B. Peter Pashigian, The Mar-
ket for Lawyers:  The Determinants  of the Demand  for and Supply of Lawyers. 20 J.L  &
Econ. 53,  72 (1977).  So conceived, the study supports both the first and the third of my
"benign"  hypotheses  in the text.  But  in each  case  I emphasize  somewhat  more  subtle
relationships  as well.  As to the  first:  there is more interaction  among business  entities
(and, therefore, more work for business lawyers) not only because of a general  increase in
the scale of economies, but also because of increasing internationalization  and an increas-
ing rate of interaction,  made  possible  by  technological  advances.  Similarly,  as to  the
third:  an  increased  level of wealth not  only  implies  more  economic transactions  (and,
therefore, more work for business  lawyers) but also allows for the political expression  of
higher  order preferences,  which  lead  to  new  systems of norns and  a  relatively  rapid
growth of certain kinds of legal work,  e.g.,  in environmental  law.
25.  See infra part V. ("Completing  the Explanation").
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modem-day specialists in the normative ordering of human relationships,
both in public  and in private spheres of activity.
In fact, the growth  of law in the areas of health  and environment has
been among the most remarkable.26  In the Progressive Era early in this
century, there were five new federal statutes enacted in the area of health
and consumer safety; in the New Deal period, there were eleven;  during
the period  from  1964 to  1979 (the "third wave,"  as it might be called),
there were sixty-two.  The figures for statutes  regulating  energy and the
environment  are just as dramatic:  two during the Progressive  Era,  five
during  the  New Deal,  and  thirty-two in  the third  wave.  And  the new
statutes  are also much more  complicated.
Such laws,  however imperfect  they are, do seem important to achiev-
ing  the  emerging  social  objectives  of  modem  societies.  I  read  in  the
newspaper last summer that  117 salmon had reached Manchester, New
Hampshire from the Atlantic Ocean, by way of the once-dead and totally
polluted  Merrimack  River.  This  small  environmental  miracle  was
largely  the work  of lawyers.27  A short while  later, I  read in the  same
paper, the Boston Globe, about the Penobscot  River in Maine.  Twenty-
five  years ago it was  a sewer that nobody wanted to get near.  Now,  on
every  summer  weekend,  you  can  see  families  on  its banks  picnicking,
swimming,  and fishing.  Government  action  and strict  legal  rules were
responsible for this change.  If you live in a less polluted part of America,
you might be tempted to dismiss such  an accomplishment as yet another
example  of overly  costly  romantic  striving  for perfection.  But  on  the
same  day,  I happened  to look at  the June  1991  issue of National Geo-
graphic, which  carried  an article  on industrial  pollution in Eastern  Eu-
rope-in countries that have little environmental regulation to speak of.
I  saw picture  after picture  of the  result:  filthy  skies,  sooted buildings,
dead trees, choking workers, and carbon-coated  children.  I wished those
children, like my own, could sit next to clear water and watch the salmon
swim.  It occurred  to me that over-regulation  is bad,  but under-regula-
tion can  be a lot worse.
To make my argument about the connection between wealth levels and
growth in the demand for law a bit stronger, and to suggest more specific
ways  to define  and test the thesis,  I must say more about  the timing of
changes  in wealth  levels and legal regulation  in the post-World  War II
era.  Here is an initial stab  at this project.
In the  1950s and  1960s, there was a great increase in the real or infla-
tion-adjusted  income of Americans,  as well  as significant  growth in pro-
ductivity  and  average  annual  GNP.2"  Americans  also  experienced  an
26.  Statistics in this paragraph are taken  from Galanter & Palay, supra note  3, at 41
n.27.
27.  Lawyers  were  involved  in  advocating  and legislating  environmental  protection,
making  regulations, and counseling client companies about  compliance.
28.  See Council of Econ.  Advisors,  1989 Annual Report Tables  B-2, B-3, B-30, B-45,
B-46  (in  Economic Report of the  President  1989).  The data  in  these tables  also show
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increase relative  to  other countries-the U.S.  was  on top of the world.
This increase in economic well-being was, I suggest, an essential precur-
sor to the "third  wave"  of regulation  in the United  States:  the appear-
ance  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  of massively  important  and
complicated  regulatory  initiatives  in health, safety,  environmental qual-
ity, pension  security,  and  other  areas  that previous  generations  might
have considered  matters of secondary concern. 9
Recall  some  of the highlights  of that  heady  era  of new  regulation.
Medicare and Medicaid were created in  1965, causing a sea of change in
health care financing and regulation.  Major statutes on health care plan-
ning, financing, and cost control followed.  The Occupational  Safety and
Health Act  was enacted  in  1970.  Environmental  statutes  included  the
National  Environmental  Policy  Act of 1969,  major amendments  to the
Clean Air Act in  1966 and  1970, and repeated amendments to the Fed-
eral Water Pollution  Control Act.  And the  most important  legislation
on pensions in generations,  ERISA, was enacted in  1974.
This third great wave of regulatory  activity  was characterized  by dis-
tinctly different subject matters than the regulatory efforts of the second
great wave, the New Deal.  New  Deal  statutes concerned  regulation  of
areas  such  as  labor relations,  securities  markets,  financial  institutions,
and utilities.  In other words, the New Deal focused on jobs, money, and
the basic rudiments  of civilized living.  In contrast, the  third wave em-
phasized the basic refinements of civilized living:  advanced health care, a
clean environment, extra security in old age, and so on.  Only a wealthier
society could adopt the mindset needed  to make  these demands on the
legal  system.
But  the story  did not  end  with  the advent  of the  third  wave  in  the
1960s and early  1970s.  Later, in the  1970s and  into the  1980s,  the eco-
nomic  well-being  of Americans  entered  a  period  of stasis.  There  was
only a very modest increase in the real income of average citizens,  and
relative to other countries  the United States appeared  to be in economic
decline.  How did this change  affect regulatory  activity?
Just as the increase in wealth led to a burst of regulatory  law making
only after a considerable time lag, so too did economic stagnation lead to
a relative decline in the growth of law making only after a lag.  A gross
but probably not inaccurate description  of this turn of events  would  be
that  efforts  to install new  regulatory  systems  tapered  off after the  mid-
1970s, although much legal work in the  1970s and  1980s resulted simply
from the working out of and modification  of regulatory schemes created
subsequent stagnation.  For example, real  median  family  income doubled from  1947  to
1973 but barely  increased at  all between  1973  and  1987.
29.  The first two waves  of regulation  occurred  in the Progressive  Era and  the New
Deal.  The differences between the New  Deal regulation and that of the  1960s and  1970s
are an important topic of analysis by historians  of regulation. See,  eg., Thomas  K.  Mc-
Craw, Prophets of Regulation  303-04 (1984) (contrasting assumptions about markets and
the proper role of government  agencies in  these two eras).
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in the  third wave.  Regulations  were  adopted  pursuant  to the  enabling
statutes, and counseling,  litigation,  and regulatory adjustments  followed
en masse.
It is possible, of course, that the very intensity and cost of the regula-
tory systems created in the third wave contributed to economic  stagna-
tion, but that  issue is not part of my present discussion.  Furthermore,
the stagnation of economic growth  probably led to the calls, circa  1980,
for deregulation.  Ironically, deregulatory initiatives, when they were im-
plemented, seem only to have added, at least temporarily, to the demand
for legal work.  It takes enormous effort to dismantle a regulatory system
and work  out all  the consequences,  and  lawyers  are the  workers  most
qualified  to do the job.
Now note this twist:  an economic downturn can, as has recently hap-
pened,  lead  to bankruptcies,  restructurings,  and  reorganizations,  all of
which increase the demand for legal work.  Perhaps,  then, the essential
factor in explaining the growth  of legal activity is simply social  or eco-
nomic  change that puts  into  question  the rights  and  duties of persons
toward one another, thereby creating demand for normative ordering to
settle  the uncertainty.  In other words,  new legal  work is  created  by a
bust as well as a boom, because governance mechanisms are disrupted by
either  sort of change. 3 °  But  I  would  question  whether  change  on  the
downside usually  creates  as much legal  work  as  change  on the upside.
Over the long haul, assuming that we define "legal  work"  to include the
creation and  development  of major  new  regulatory  systems  as  well  as
litigation, it probably does not.  Lawsuits  may  take a swing upwards in
an economic downturn, but large upswings in overall legal activity seem
to depend on economic growth.
What about the future?  If my account has merit, it allows us to make
some  very  rough  "if  . . then.  . ." judgments.  If economic  stagnation
continues,  it  may  mean  a  gradual  stabilization  or  moderation  in  the
growth of demand for lawyers to work in the regulatory areas character-
istic of the third wave.  If economic growth resumes,  this moderation is
less likely to happen, and at some future level of higher wealth one might
30.  Compare:
The rate of economic change increases instability, and thus the temptations and
opportunities  for defection from present governance arrangements, the transac-
tion  costs of devising  new  ones, the  uncertainty  of parties,  and  the likely  or
anticipated  ineffectiveness  of informal sanctions.  Again, advance  and detailed
specification  of duties,  and  reliance  on  formal  enforcement  mechanisms,  is
likely to be enhanced.
Galanter and Rogers, supra note  16, at 44.  Later they argue more specifically  about the
relationship  between  economic change  and lawsuits or formal  dispute resolution  proce-
dures:  "Any  major change  in  economic  activity  (boom  or bust)  has the  effect  of  dis-
turbing  prior governance  relations  [among  businesses],  simply  by  changing  the  actors
involved.  Declining  economic  performance, moreover, would  reasonably  be seen as in-
creasing  the incidence  of injury, and  perceived  injury.  Most  simply,  with  a  declining
surplus,  zero sum  conflict  increases.  The number  of issues  in  dispute, then,  would  be
expected  to increase, and the stakes in  dispute would rise."  Id. at 53.
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anticipate  a  new  burst  of regulatory  activity  associated  with  an  even
higher-order  set  of social  preferences.  What  the shape  of that  fourth
wave may be, we can only speculate.
D.  Greater  Involvement in Complex, Formal  Organizations
Consider this subtle but important relationship.  When economic  ac-
tivity-or, for that matter, any other human activity-is carried out by a
large  formal  organization  (such  as  a business  corporation,  a  nonprofit
corporation, or a government agency), it will more frequently make sense
to hire  a lawyer  to  engage  in  normative ordering  rather  thafi  to have
nonspecialists do it.  This is because there are economies of scale in per-
forming the kinds of tasks that lawyers do.  After some threshold  level,
when  an organization  is  "large  enough,"  using specialists in normative
ordering-that is, lawyers-makes  economic sense.
An  example  may  help  make  the point clear.  Suppose Martha  owns
and operates a delivery truck as sole proprietor.  Mike owns and operates
an automotive  repair shop as sole proprietor.  Whenever Martha's truck
needs repairs, she brings it to Mike, who does the work and charges a fee.
The parties feel no need to hire a lawyer for advice  on how to structure
their relationship, or to use contracts  devised by a lawyer, or, except in
extraordinary circumstances,  to employ a lawyer to resolve the disagree-
ments that arise between  them from time to time.  This is not to say that
there is no normative  ordering of the relationship;  there  is plenty.  But
because the parties know each other, would like to continue the relation-
ship, and can readily ask questions,  express  dissatisfaction, and bargain
for adjustments,  they are  usually  able  to  structure  the  relationship  by
themselves.
Note that even if the economy had thousands  of Marthas dealing one-
on-one with thousands of Mikes, there would still be only occasional de-
mand for the services of lawyers.  Most normative ordering of these busi-
ness relationships would be done by nonspecialists as an incident to their
other work.
Suppose, by contrast, Boston Edison Co.  wants to engage Special Ship
Corp. to build and charter a special ocean-going ship for the purpose of
transporting  vast cargoes  of coal  to  Edison's  generating  facilities.  The
deal  involves many  millions of dollars, thousands of employees on both
sides, and numerous uncertainties and contingencies.  The parties feel it
important to reduce to paper their understanding of what happens  under
the myriad  contingencies,  and to specify  in advance who  owes what  to
whom.  They readily  turn to lawyers who  specialize  in  negotiating  and
drafting complex contracts, even though the hourly pay of those special-
ists is higher than the hourly pay of all corporate officers  involved in the
deal.  The costs  are minuscule in relation  to the  total  value of the eco-
nomic arrangements,  yet the benefits, in terms of stabilizing expectations
and reducing the transaction costs of later misunderstandings,  conflicts,
and dispute resolution, are potentially enormous.
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As this example  suggests,  the work of lawyers  can often create an in-
crease  in real  economic  well-being  by reducing  transaction  costs.  It is
wrong to see  the work of lawyers as essentially  restricted to assisting in
zero-sum  games  or,  even  worse,  as being  "parasitic"  and  wealth-con-
suming  or wealth-destroying.  Normative  ordering  often  makes  people
better off, and it often leads to a net increase  in well-being.  Not  to see
this is to miss the boat.
That was a nice story about how formal  organizations-whether  pri-
vate or public, profit or nonprofit--can  lead to greater use of lawyers (as
well as other specialists).  But how, if at all,  is this illustrated by major
historical trends?
First consider some historical shifts on a large time frame.  The histo-
rian Alfred Chandler  points out that in  colonial times most Americans
worked on family farms, and most of those who did not worked in small
economic  units. 31  By  the middle of the twentieth  century, the situation
was  quite  different:  a  vast  segment  of the population  worked  in large
multi-unit  organizations.32  By  the  early  1980s,  corporations accounted
for 88%  of business receipts, with the larger corporations accounting for
disproportionately  more.33  Throughout  the  long period  of the  rise  to
dominance  of corporations and other formal organizations,  the number
and importance  of lawyers have grown.
The  picture looks  somewhat  different  if we  focus  on the post-World
War II period.  If we assume, as seems plausible, that economies of scale
in using lawyers will taper off after reaching some threshold level of prac-
ticality,34 then recent changes in the average size (in terms of employees)
of economic units have not seemed dramatic enough to have a big impact
on demand for lawyers.  Nevertheless, there has been increasing involve-
ment in formal organizations that are large enough to find frequent resort
to  lawyers  cost-effective,  and  the  increase  has  outstripped  population
growth.  At the least, such an increase  is strongly suggested by the fact
that participation in the workplace went from  38%  of the population  in
1960 to over 45%  in 1985. 35  (Incidentally, this increase was due in large
part to the inclusion of women  in the out-of-home workforce.)  It is rea-
sonable to suppose that this increase was paralleled by an increase in the
number of "large-enough"  economic units and, therefore,  in the demand
for legal services.  Some data on the precise shape of the growth of law is
31.  See Alfred  D. Chandler,  Jr., The  Visible Hand:  The  Managerial  Revolution  in
American  Business  17  (1977).
32.  See id. at 482-83 (dominance of large managerial enterprises after World War II).
33.  U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,  Statistical Abstract of the United
States  1984,  at 532  (1983).
34.  This view seems consistent with evidence that large companies spend a lesser per-
centage of total sales on  legal services than do small companies.  See B. Peter Pashigian,
A  Theory of Prevention and Legal Defense with an Application to the Legal Costs of Com-
panies, 25  J.L. & Econ.  247, 260-61  (1982)  (graph  showing legal costs per million dollars
of sales).
35.  See Galanter, supra note  4, at 3.
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consistent with this view.  For example, "[fjrom  1967 to  1987,  the por-
tion  of the  receipts  of the  legal  services  industry contributed  by busi-
nesses  increased  from  39  percent  to  51  percent,  while  the  share
purchased  by  individuals  dropped  from  55  percent  to  42  percent. '36
Similarly,  although  the  "litigation  explosion"  is  popularly  blamed  on
greedy tort plaintiffs and their avaricious lawyers,  in fact there has been a
disproportionate  increase  in  recent  years  (1960-1988)  in  the extent  to
which  litigation  in federal  courts is  comprised  of businesses suing  one
another in disputes arising out of their contractual  dealings, intellectual
property claims,  and similar matters.37
V.  COMPLETING  THE EXPLANATION
So far I have argued that there are long term trends that increase the
demand for what lawyers do.  I have identified four such trends:  greater
interaction and internationalization;  greater diversity; changes  in wealth
levels; and greater involvement in complex, formal organizations.  There
are undoubtedly more such trends, and some of the others may be more
important.  In discussing each  trend, I have  tried to do three things:
ogive an intuitive sense of how the trend could lead to greater demand
for law and lawyers;
osupply initial evidence  indicating that the alleged trend is real;  and
opoint to specific areas of legal growth  that fit the proposed model  of
socioeconomic  trend and legal growth.
As an example of one of these specific areas of growth, I used increases
in wealth levels to account, not for the expansion  of law in general, but
for the especially  rapid growth  of law relating  to health  care,  environ-
ment,  occupational  safety,  and  extra  pension  security.  In  addition,  I
linked greater demographic  diversity to the  rapid expansion in employ-
ment  discrimination  law, and  increased  internationalization  to  the  de-
monstrably  great growth  in international  trade  and  finance  law.  Note
that drawing these sorts of specific  connections  is  a far more satisfying
approach than simply offering  broad theories,  such  as the supposed  ge-
neric increase among people of an all-pervading sense of entitlement, that
seek to  explain the explosion of law in general.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to show a plausible connection between
a demonstrable  social  or economic trend and a demonstrable  growth in
cognate  legal  activity.  To  be complete,  one  needs  to  explain  why  in-
creases in the demand for normative ordering have not been satisfied  by
non-legal  sources  of order  such  as  the  family,  informal  social  groups,
market forces, and the major religions.  What has happened, during this
period of massive social change,  to the ability of these other systems to
generate and enforce norms  appropriate to the changing social  and eco-
nomic conditions?
36.  Id  at 5  n.39.
37.  See id at  10 n.78.
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This is not the context in which  to develop  a full answer to this  ques-
tion,  so I  will  sketch  only  the briefest  hints  of an  answer.  Briefly,  in
modem societies, with the great mobility and interconnectedness  of their
populations,  it  is  less  costly  than  ever  to  escape  from  informal  social
groups  and their informal methods of social  control.  If you lived  as a
shepherd in an isolated Greek village in the early part of this century and
expected  to spend all of your life there, you cared a lot about  what the
neighbors  thought,  and  about  your  reputation.  In  contrast,  if your
neighbors  in Westchester  County  do  not  think well  of you today,  you
may  choose  to  move  or, easier  yet,  to  ignore  them  and  socialize  with
people who  live elsewhere.
In modem societies, market  forces do enforce some important  norms
of behavior-honesty,  diligence,  and even  (as  Adam  Smith pointed out
so long ago) politeness  and cooperation.  But of course they  leave many
extemalities-public  goods that must  be subsidized,  and  third-party  ef-
fects that must be taxed or regulated.
In modem  societies,  the  power  of the  ethical  precepts  of the major
world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism)
is  often  supposed  to have been  weakened  by  an  underlying  decline  in
faith.  But even  if this is not really  so, or if a great revival  restores reli-
gious  faith,  there  is  a  more  fundamental  problem.  Religions  tend  to
ground their norms of behavior in texts that have been sacralized-that
is,  made  deserving  of special  reverence  and  acceptance,  and  exempted
from fundamental criticism or second-guessing.  Sacralization helps give
religious  precepts  their  great  psychological  force-a  force  that  legal
precepts only rarely achieve.  Yet it also creates rigidity, and as a practi-
cal matter this tends to confine effective  religious ethics to very  general,
transcendent norms of behavior appropriate to the most basic conditions
and  relationships  of humankind.  (Thou  shalt  not  kill;  thou  shalt not
steal; etc.)  It is hard, for example,  to derive a scheme of environmental
regulation  from the  Bible or the Koran.  What do  either of these  texts
have  to tell  us about how  many  parts-per-million  of sodium should  be
allowed in the city's drinking water?
While we  might in fact trace a norm of concern  for human health or
the  natural environment  to a  sacred  text,  it is  quite another matter  to
develop the specific, detailed, and flexible rules that are needed in today's
world.  Doing that involves investigation  and arguments  about the costs
and  benefits  of various  acts.  There  must be  resort to  pragmatic,  fact-
based,  rational  reasoning  about  means  and  ends,  and  there  will  most
surely be an opportunity for competing interest groups to argue different
interpretations of these  questions  while still  appearing  to take the  high
moral ground.  Similarly,  what  do  you do  when  a sacred  text does lay
down a very specific rule-like a prohibition on interest for money lent-
that now seems wrong and even suicidal?  Creative theologians can come
up with a solution, often a convoluted one, but the process is likely to be
costly and not fully satisfying.  Sacralization  entails rigidity, and  in  our
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modem world rigidity has great costs.  More generally,  it is intrinsically
difficult  to  derive  the incredibly  complex,  elaborate,  and  ever-changing
rules needed  to satisfy the modem  world's new demands  for normative
ordering by resort to religious  sources and institutions.
VI.  COMPLETING  THE ASSESSMENT
So far, this  essay has approached  the issue of evaluation  rather indi-
rectly, by critiquing what I label  "cancerous"  theories of the growth of
law and lawyers  and proffering  a prima facie  case for supposedly  "be-
nign"  hypotheses  about  such growth.  This  approach may  be strength-
ened  by  analyses  that  develop  more  carefully  why  it is  that  the  work
newly  demanded  of lawyers  is probably  useful.  For  example,  Ronald
Gilson has argued forcefully that many business lawyers-in particular,
those who help put deals together-are best understood  as "transaction
cost engineers"  and play an important  positive role  in value creation.3
An  analogous argument can  be made about the counseling role of law-
yers.39  Evaluating  the role of lawyers  as  litigators  is far more  compli-
cated,  because  at  first  glance  much  litigation  seems  to  be  a  merely
redistributive or rent-seeking  activity.  A full assessment of litigation  re-
quires consideration of its other functions, such as forcing internalization
of costs (an efficiency-enhancing  consequence of an ideal torts system) or
producing relatively non-monetized or non-marketed  goods, such  as lib-
erty and a sense of fairness.  It is also helpful  to bear in mind that more
lawyers do transactional  and counseling work  than do litigation.
Quite obviously, however, even a full  acceptance of the points  I have
made about the causes  of growth  leaves enormous scope for further in-
quiry and debate  about the net value of the postulated  relationships.  I
noted, for example, that there are structural reasons to expect some over-
consumption  in  legal  services,  but  I  have  no systematic  empirical  evi-
dence to support  an estimate of the size of such  effects.  Similarly,  it is
conceivable  that even  if the  four "benign"  hypotheses  (and  others  like
them) explaining the increase in demand for law and lawyers are strongly
operative, there may still be too much of a good thing.  Some  observers
have a nagging concern,  for example, that having lawyers in  a complex
economy will lower transaction costs and  enhance stability and  predict-
ability up to a point, but that additional lawyers will work extra hard to
find ambiguity and uncertainty that previously would not have been per-
38.  See Ronald J. Gilson,  Value Creation  by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and  Asset
Pricing, 94 Yale  LU.  239,  246, 253-55  (1984).
39.  Scholars  in law and  economics  are in  fact  beginning  to  conduct  careful  formal
analyses of the conditions  under which legal  counseling is socially desirable or optimal.
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, LegalAdvice About Acts Already Committed, 10 Int'l
Rev. L. & Econ.  149 (1990);  Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated  Acts  The
Decision to Obtain Advice; Its Social Desirability,  and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J.
Legal Stud.  123 (1988);  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private versus Socially Optimal
Provision of Ex  Ante  Legal  Advice  (Program  in  Law  and  Economics,  Harvard  Law
School, Discussion Paper No. 98,  Oct. 1991).
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ceived,  and thus to increase  transaction  costs and  uncertainty.  Such  a
concern  depends  on an  assumption that market  forces  have inadequate
mechanisms  for stopping growth at the optimal  level.
Is there  a good way to short-circuit  the analytical  debates  by a fairly
direct test of the overall  net impact of lawyers on social  welfare?  Some
economists have made passes at this daunting  task.  Magee, Brock,  and
Young collected some statistics for thirty nations and purported to find a
negative  relationship  between  lawyers  and  economic  growth  rates.40
Frank  Cross  has  effectively  criticized  the  design  and execution  of this
study,41 however, and offered a similar  study with improved design  and
data that found no such relationship.42  Cross  also critiqued  two  other
studies, 43 highlighted and challenged the persistent (but incorrect) identi-
fication  by many economists  and even  legal scholars of legal work with
rent-seeking  or purely redistributive  activity,'  emphasized  the transac-
tion-facilitating  role of most  lawyers,45  and  offered  empirical  evidence
that lawyers  are important in producing  "nonmarketed  social  goods." 6
Problems  abound,  and  they  will  affect  future studies.  For example,
even if it were to be shown that, across countries, relatively greater use of
lawyers is correlated with lower economic  growth rates, it would be diffi-
cult,  without  much more hypothesizing  and testing, to  assess  causality
and meaning.  Countries at lower  stages of economic development  may
more easily achieve high growth rates simply because they are still in the
process  of  adopting  already  available  technologies  and  organizational
forms,  whereas  the  most  advanced  countries  depend  for  additional
growth on genuine  innovations,  which  are slow  in  coming  and impose
natural limits to growth.  At the same time, countries moving from a less
to a more advanced stage of economic development increasingly use law-
yers  as  they  become  wealthier  and more  complex.  Under  such  condi-
tions,  to  find  that  mature  economies  (those  at  the  high  end  of the  S-
shaped growth curve) have both more lawyers and modest growth is not
to find anything that is necessarily  suboptimal; nor would such a coexis-
40.  Stephen  P.  Magee  et al.,  Black  Hole  Tariffs  and  Endogenous  Policy  Theory:
Political  Economy in  General  Equilibrium  118-19  (1989).
41.  See Frank  B.  Cross,  The First Thing We  Do, Let's Kill All the Economists:  An
Empirical  Evaluation of the Effect of  Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political
System,  70 Tex. L. Rev. 645,  668-70  (1992).
42.  See id. at 672-76.
43.  See id. at 670-72.  The two studies are Kevin M. Murphy et al., The Allocation of
Talent: Implications  for Growth, 106 Q.J. Econ. 503 (1991), which Cross characterizes  as
more  rigorous  but yielding,  as the  authors  themselves  noted,  only  weak  and basically
insignificant results  concerning the effect of lawyers  on economic growth, and David N.
Laband & John P. Sophocleus,  The Social Cost ofRent-Seeking:  First  Estimates, 58  Pub.
Choice 269  (1988),  which  Cross characterizes  as limited in scope.
44.  See Cross, supra note 41,  at 650 n.26,  653-68.
45.  See id. at 655-58.
46.  Id.  at  676-78,  where  Cross  offers  the results  of a regression  analysis  indicating
statistically significant and substantial  positive correlations  between "lawyerification"  (as
measured by the percentage of lawyers to all white collar workers) and various measures
of political rights  and civil liberties.
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tence of phenomena prove  that lawyers  caused  or contributed  to a low
growth rate.
With all of this in mind, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it will
be extremely difficult to achieve a definitive empirical  assessment of the
overall  net impact of lawyers  on human welfare.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I have developed  the following  points:
oThe  growth  of law and  lawyers  in  the last generation  is  real,  dra-
matic, and pervasive.
oTo understand  the growth of law, it is important to develop  a com-
prehensive notion of what lawyers do:  they are specialists in normative
ordering.
oSome explanations of the growth of law make it out to be a cancerous
and essentially unhealthy process.  Though some of these accounts  con-
tain a significant  core of truth,  they  appear  to  be unsatisfactory  if put
forward as full (or even leading) explanations of the phenomenon of law's
explosive growth:
oThe theory of moral decline  would appear  to explain  legal growth
only in a few areas such as criminal  and  family law.
oClaims of lawyer-created  demand seem implausible  if meant to be
major explanations  of growth  in  law,  for they  do  not seem  to  account
satisfactorily for the creation of major legislative and regulatory schemes,
and they tend to ignore  the  reasons  why individuals  and  organizations
are willing to seek out and pay for lawyers'  services.
oThe theory of market imperfections does suggest that there may be
significant fat and inflation in the market for legal services, as in the mar-
kets for all other professional  services, but these flaws hardly seem capa-
ble of explaining the bulk of growth in the law, or its distribution across
subject matters and types of practice.
oSome explanations  for the growth of law suggest that it is essentially
a benign  process.  My  approach  was to  suggest that certain  long  term
trends have increased the demand for normative ordering, and thus, the
demand for law and lawyers.  I concentrated  on four such trends;  I don't
claim  to have presented a full list.  The four are:
ogreater internationalization  and other forms of interaction;
ogreater diversity in the population;
ochanges  in wealth levels;  and
ogreater involvement  of the workforce  in formal  organizations.
In  each  case,  I  presented  preliminary  evidence  to  indicate  that  the
trend is real and serious, and I explained  why there is a connection be-
tween the trend and demonstrable growth in specific areas of law and law
practice that one would expect to be affected by that trend.  It is a hidden
leitmotif of these explanations that the normative ordering generated  by
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these trends  is in principle a value-increasing  service,  not a parasitic  or
pointless activity.
Obviously, much more work is needed to develop  and test hypotheses
of the sort I have put forth.  I claim only to have  made them  plausible
enough to warrant and stimulate further refinement and testing.  Never-
theless, they do generate a certain sort of cautious hope about our profes-
sion.  To the extent that they or similar accounts  are valid, they hardly
justify  complacency  about  the legal system, but  they  do  appear  to rule
out deep  cynicism.  No  doubt there  is much about the legal profession
that ought to be changed.  But the profession  appears  already  to be  a
useful one, for the whole modem world is demanding its services.  And it
can properly aspire to be noble, for at its best its members'  services  can
augment the  sum of human welfare.